Wars of Watergate

Chapter Summaries

Book One: Of Time And The Man: Discord, Disorder, and Richard Nixon

Chapter 1: Breaking Faith: The 1960s

Aftermath of Kennedy's death; Johnson's leislative agenda (1963-64); 6 mo. period (Great Society); taxes, civil rights, mass transit, clean air, wilderness, training programs, anti-poverty; broad, but not deep, support; negative reputation and image (wheeler-dealer, manipulator); 1964 election vs. Goldwater; 61% of popular vote; people voting for Johnson despite mistrust of him; rhetoric: don't get involved in Vietnam; swollen Democratic majority; continuation of legislation (War on Poverty); outbreak of violence in 1965; antiwar ralliesincreasing involvement in Vietnam; thin-skinnedness with press & public opinion; foreign policy spilling over into domestic policy, causing turmoil & upheval; supportive view of war by public in public opinion polls until 1967; lack of thoughtful policy; transformation of Presidential powers/office (growth); McCarthy and R. Kennedy challenges to Johnson in '68; Johnson dropped out of race (March 1968); 486k troops in Vietnam

Chapter 2: Making Many Nixons: 1913-1965

Flashback from 1968 election (Nixon's "coronation"); dominant figure in 20th century politics; childhood; "Show me a good loser and I'll show you a loser"; Whittier, Duke Law School; 1937 return to CA as lawyer; 1940, marriage; 1942, Washington, Officer Candidate School (Navy); South Pacific service; 1946, public office campaign, beat Rep. Jerry Voorhis by 15,000 votes out of 150,000 total; Chotiner (person running campaign); member of House Labor Committee and House Committee on Un-American Activities; 1948, Alger Hiss appeared before Committee; Chambers-Hiss conflict; Nixon gained publicity by leading the case against Hiss; 1950 California Senate seat opened up; Nixon campaigned against Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas, expected campaign of hyperbole & innuendo, "Pink right down to her underwear"; emergence of "Tricky Dick" image; won by >600k votes; nominated for V.P. in 1952; publicity about a campaign fund; negative press; appeared on TV - Checkers speech; emergence of Nixon into national prominence; dislike of Nixon by many in Eisenhower administration; failure to get rid of him for 1956 ticket; 1959 went to Russia ("Kitchen Debate" w/ Khrushchev); emergence as candidate in 1960 Pres. campaign; dominance of new media/image in campaign, failure of Nixon in debates (too much "substance", not enough "style"); lost by 113k votes out of 68 million cast; returned to California, to law firm; challenged Pat Brown for CA governorship in 1962, lost (CA voters didn't think he had enough experience to govern California); "last" press conference held after election; went to NY in 1963 to join Wall Street firm, Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander; handled Supreme Court case; backed Goldwater in 1964; biding his time; helped regroup the Republican Party after Goldwater's defeat

Chapter 3: "Bring Us Together": 1965-1968

Nixon's political limbo ("in the wilderness") and path to WH; campaign trail 1966; becoming Johnson's debating partner; Republican gains in '66; Nixon appealing to Goldwater Republicans, moderate Republicans, Eisenhower; attacked by Johnson; 1967, began to prepare for Presidential run, touching bases; country coming apart; MLK assassination, new wave of race riots; protesters, & opposing "Silent Majority"; "law-and-order"/old-fashioned Democrats vs. new, protest Democrats; '68 primary season, Nixon struck his law and order theme; further division of Democrats by Wallace campaign; give Nixon a chance to appeal to the center; George Romney (MI governor in Democratic stronghold) was other Republican candidate; "brainwashing" comment, too straightforward, Vietnam problems; August 1968: Republican National Convention in Miami; Goldwater not credible, but Reagan was Goldwater surrogate appealing to Goldwater's base; elected governor of California (defeated Pat Brown) in 1966; Reagan-Rockefeller alliance to defeat Nixon; Nixon maneuvered to guarantee Southern delegation (South Carolina senator J. Strom Thurmond), made deals about busing, segregation, Supreme Court justices; Democratic National Convention in Chicago was disaster, McCarthy vs. Humphrey vs. Kennedy; protests erupted into violence in Chicago streets; reinforcement of fears of Silent Majority; Humphrey emerged as candidate thanks to Daley machine; Nixon focused campaign on alienated middle; avoided discussion of Vietnam and other difficult issues; "New Nixon" sold to media; changing to meet the needs of his audience; NH primary, pledged to end war; pushed to reveal his plan; scheduled speech, then Johnson address scheduled, so Nixon's speech canceled; focused on issue of domestic peace; Aug 8, 1968: accepted party's nomination; appealed to "quiet voices" and the "nonshouters"; October, Paris negotiations with North Vietnamese looked like they would promise a breakthrough; 27 October: Nixon charged political opportunism; 31 October: Johnson halted bombing and said peace talks in Paris would resume 6 November; people saw it as political opportunism; Nixon won, 43.4% vs. 42.7% (Humphrey) and remainder (Wallace); 2.5 million less than 1960 total; 3/10 white voters voting for Johnson in '64 voted for Nixon or Wallace in '68; Humphrey conceded on November 6, Nixon gave speech (sign, "Bring Us Together")

Book Two: First Term, First Wars

Chapter 4: "The Man On Top"

Nixon beginning first term; iron triangle (legislators, bureaucracy, lobbyists) made into iron square by Nixon adding the media; broadening of Vietnam War during first 2 years of Nixon's presidency, and corresponding militancy of antiwar protests; worries about leaks; general views of Nixon's 1st term (domestic policies far outstripped foreign policy achievements); transformations of Presidency into monarchical court, starting with Eisenhower; Nixon continued Johnson's role (intensity of involvement); President & aides treating Congress like it only existed to follow instructions; Haldeman and Ehrlichman role, public visibility to take heat for President; Haldeman's role was to isolate the President; dissemination of tasks/directives via Haldeman; Nixon encouraged/practiced compartmentalization, ensuring fragmentation of power; Dent: "The man on top was on top"; two Nixons: idealistic/thoughtful/generous Nixon, and vindictive/petty/emotional Nixon; a President in command - with whatever personality was momentarily dominant in his psyche; Nixon's view of Cabinet as an extension of RN and Oval Office; "I've always thought this country could run itself domestically without a President, all you need is a competent Cabinet to run the country at home. You need a President for foreign policy" - but FAR from the truth; Cabinet secretaries seen as spokesman for RN; Kissinger: RN trusted his aides more than his Cabinet, due to political/personal needs, need to enhance image & power, and protect public standing; Nixon stated he had to adopt "complex political strategies" (PR, preoccupation with "the opposition") to secure his program, become an "activist President in domestic affairs... Knock heads together in order to get things done"; after 2 years Nixon saw PR failure, while in fact he had been in public's eye for 20+ years, so their perception of him had crystallized; venting against bureaucracy (as convenient safety valve for political frustration); Nixon-Kissinger established group of people to run foreign policy, bypassing Department of State; autonomy of bureaucracy severely reduced; control over operation of bureaucracies led to parallel systems of activity; Huston Plan (Tom Huston): Feb. 1970, proposed procedures for internal security handling, consolidation of intelligence-gethering; 5 June 1970: met with FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, NSA: development of plan to curtail illegal activities of society's enemies; Huston & Sullivan (3rd in FBI) bypassed Hoover; Hoover's reluctance to break law led to scuttling of plan by President; Huston plan still pursued; led to formation of Plumbers

Chapter 5: "I want it done, whatever the cost." Enemies, Plumbers, Taps, and Spies

Huston plan: impose President's personal direction on bureaucracies; in 1st 3 months of 1st term, Ehrlichman hired John Caulfield (former NYPD) to establish WH investigations unit; August 1971: John Dean (WH Counsel) prepared rationale for WH "enemies list"; list grew to >200, included institutions; Dean had role of enforcer of list; Haldeman subjected some to IRS audits (Washington Post lawyer audited 3 years in a row); DOJ, Secret Service, military intelligence added >4k people, >2k groups for IRS to study; Caulfield assigned to stimulate activity in IRS; August 1972: RN told Ehrlichman he wanted full control of IRS, FBI, DOJ, Department of Treasury officials in next term; Dean bypassed Treasury Secretary George Shultz in pursuing tax cases; May 1971: Haldeman told President that Colson had hired thugs to attack antiwar protesters; expansion against enemies to include more direct action, physical force; discussion (RH and Haldeman) about political "dirty tricks"; hiring of Segretti by Chapin; increasing paranoia about leaks from beginning (within 5 months of inauguration, 21 stories based on leaks from National Security Council); June 1971: publication of Pentagon Papers; told Haldeman to conduct loyalty tests to investigate, to get it done whatever the cost; 13 June 1971: NY Times published Pentagon Papers; raised question of deception and government credibility; Supreme Court lifted injunction nearly unanimously, but was divided behind the scenes (Black - assailed Administration for even temporary injuction; Warren - defended Administration; White - encouraged prosecution of Ellsberg as criminal); leaks, and failure of courts to provide Administration with desired protection, led to creation of the Plumbers; June 1971: Nixon wanted fire lit under FBI in Ellsberg investigation; 1969: RN ordered Ehrlichman to create in-house group to bypass FBI in leak investigations; December 1972: Washington Post revealed existence of Plumbers; January 1973: Krogh testimony to Senate committee, not asked about Plumbers' methods; Ehrlichman served as WH-Plumbers conduit; goals/tasks focused on covert activities; supervised by Krogh and David Young; Hunt (CIA) and Liddy (FBI) were unit's operatives, had no moral qualms about use of illegal methods; permission to burglarize Fielding (Ellsberg's psychologist) office signed off by Ehrlichman (with President's approval); Colson confirmed, President nondenial denial; Ehrlichman & Krogh considered Fielding break-in seminal Watergate episode, more significant than Watergate break-in; April 1973: Ellsberg trial judge received info about Hunt/Liddy connection to WH; May 1973: Ellsberg trial declared mistrial; link between Young/Krogh and WH was critical to Watergate; Dec 1971: leak of NSC memos re Indo-Pakistani War; traced to Joint Chiefs assistant Radford; government tapped Radford's phone, found he was actually leaking from NSC/Kissinger to Joint Chiefs; docs delivered to Admiral Welander,then relayed to Joint Chiefs chairman Admiral Moorer; 9 May 1969: NY Times revealed Cambodian bombing; phones of reporters tapped; Kissinger aide (Haig): liaison between NSC & FBI; 12 July 1971: President ordered Assistant AG (Mardian) to give wiretap logs to Ehrlichman; Sullivan helped get wiretap logs to E, was fired by Hoover; 1965: Army intelligence operation to collect info; continued under Nixon; Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights drawn into question about program, program was defended by William Rehnquist (Assistant AG); issue was over 1st Ammendment rights; Tatum v. Laird court case in Court of Appeals; 20 months later, case came before Supreme Court, court upheld Rehnquist's opinion in 5-4 decision; Rehnquist refused to recuse himself, despite having personal connection/knowledge of case; if he had recused himself, 4-4 tie would have upheld lower court's decision (Tatum v. Laird would have sought injunction to prevent executive branch from gathering intelligence); Judge in Chicago 5 trial (1969) concluded wiretap tapes on SDS, Black Panthers, campus antiwar dissidents had no relevance to evidence in trial, in contrast to Supreme Court doctrine requiring illegal surveillance relevant to case to be turned over to defense; October 1970: "White Panthers" case in Ann Arbor, defense requested government to turn over wiretaps and have hearing to determine if evidence tainted government's case; December 1970: Attorney General responded that wiretaps were necessary for national security (protect nation from attacks on government); District Court judge Dannon Keith (January 1971) ruled in defense's favor; government appealed to 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld D.C. judge; June 1971: case went to Supreme Court (United States v. United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan); government ignored precedence set by Steel Seizure Case of 1952, asserted same powers asserted by King George III in Revolutionary Era re indiscriminate searches and seizures; SCOTUS affirmed lower courts' decisions, but decision was kept narrow, avoiding "inherent powers of executive branch" issue; was still a rebuke to Administration; decision announced in Keith case on 19 June 1972, two days after Watergate

Chapter 6: The Politics of Deadlock: Nixon and Congress

Resistant Congress; formation of independent Congress with its own bureaucracy, goals, agenda, will; magnification during Nixon presidency; animosity between Nixon and Congress set stage for war during 2nd term; comparison between Nixon's confrontational style (facing Democratic Congress) & Eisenhower's (also facing Dem. Congress); Eisenhower did not strong-arm, made friends in Senate/House, respected Congress's foreign policy role; Nixon twisted arms, despised/cut off connections, resented Congressional forays into foreign policy; unpopular President tenures (Hoover, Truman) usually followed by good ones (Roosevelt, Eisenhower); but after Johnson, Nixon only widened the Executive-Legislative gap; ideological strain between Leg. & Exec. served as informal extension of checks & balances; "Deadlock of Democracy"; James Burns: Madisonian system of checks & balances led to paralysis of government; Johnson led to questioning need for strong Presidency; Nixon refused to recognize shared power; departure for Republican; Congress, after Johnson's imperial Presidency, was not inclined to abandon their share/role in governance; President presented his campaign as pact between the President and the people, bypassing Congress; Nixon took liberal article of strong/aggressive President who dealt with the people on intimate terms and reversed it on the Democrats ("He caught the liberals bathing and walked off with their clothes"); Nixon's first-term legislative agenda governed by President's promise to "knock heads together";

(1) impoundment of funds to subvert Congress & not implement laws led to conflict; March 1971: Ervin assembled Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers to start impoundment discussion; (Nixon was abusing impoundment, impounded > $18 billion in his 1st term); October 1972: vetoed Federal Water Pollution Control Act, veto was overridden, impounded the $18 billion in spending in the bill; Senate Judiciary and Government Operations subcommittee met again with hearings re impoundment; Summer 1974: House Judiciary Committee considered whether impoundment activities constituted grounds for impeachment;

(2) reorganization of Executive Branch undertaken by many Presidents in the 20th Century; Nixon's reorganization was clearly about power; opposed by those who would lose their power, making it difficult; 1970: Nixon created OMB (Office of Management and Budget) to erode Cabinet's power; proposed creating Domestic Council (analog of National Security Council), consolidating domestic operations of executive branch and threatening ties to Congressional committees/staff; Cabinet made irrelevant via WH contact with middle-level bureaucrats; Nixon's public declaration was the need to change framework of government to make it more responsive (1971 State of Union); Nixon's 1971 reorganization plan spoiled by bureaucratic self-defense and Congressional suspicion; purposes were not related to efficiency but to furthering political/personal motives;

(3) SCOTUS nominee battles; June 1968, Warren notified Johnson of intent to resign; nomination of Justice Fortas to Chief Justice failed due to ethics issues, close connection to Presidency (separation of powers); 1 October: rejected by Senate; Warren told Nixon he would step down June 1969; May 1969: Nixon nominated Earl Burger from DC Court of Appeals; incriminating evidence about Justice Fortas came up again; Chicago Tribune in May disclosed DoJ's investigation and DoJ's demand that he resign; Fortas resigned, Nixon nominated 2 Southerners, both rejected; August 1969: nominated Clement Haynsworth, rejected due to personal ethics and concern among labor & civil rights bases; rejected on 21 November 1969; 1st rejection since 1930; fragility of Nixon's Congressional support as little as 1 yr after election; nominated G. Harrold Carswell; rejected due to civil rights concern about racism; April 1970: Senate rejected Carswell; President lashed out, concluded Senate would not approve a Southerner; nominated MN judge Harry Blackmun, confirmed by Senate; 1 week before Carswell rejection, Ford brought up ethics charges against Justice Davis; seen as a political move, thinly-veiled WH attempt at impeachment; Ehrlichman, Krogh met to write up SCOTUS nominee procedures; Justice Black submitted resignation in September 1971; Justice Harlan submitted resignation 1 week later; Pat Buchanan's approach: nominate Virginia Representative, make Democrats choose between alienating blacks and alienating the South; Leonard Garment's approach: choose wisely, no surprises, head off a fight; October 1971: President nominated Lewis Powell (VA lawyer), and Assistant AG William Rehnquist; Powell easily confirmed, Rehnquist confirmed with some difficulty; Supreme Court nominees demonstrated Nixon's desire to change national policy w/o Congressional approval

(4) Vietnam conflict; Congress (due to Johnson, Gulf of Tonkin resolution) suspicious of executive war policy; Congress began to assert itself after long period of quiescence; June 1969: Senate passed National Commitments Resolution, asserting role in committal of armed forces; designed to tie the President's hands; June 1970: Senate repealed Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; largely symbollic, but important assertion; in appropriations bill, Congress passed with recommendation of withdraw of troops; President said he would ignore the proviso; Federal Court said Nixon could not ignore it; in new 1973 Congress, Majority Leader vowed action to end Vietnam War, end period of inactivity/impotence of Congress; 1973: passage of War Powers Act of 1973 signaled new era in Executive-Legislative relations; election of 1972, Nixon re-elected and Congress remained Democratic, sign of more conflict in 2nd term; comparison to Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations (1919), rejected by Congress, never passed b/c he wanted it his way or not at all

Chapter 7: Media Wars

Duality of Nixon attitude toward media: hatred, and useful tool; growing importance of media (TV) to governance; Herb Klein, Dir. of Communication post, liaison of media ('68/'69); Five O'Clock Group controlled media messages & information flow; dominance of TV over radio/newspaper: TV is shallower, lending itself to talking points; combined with laziness/lack of resources, Nixon admin. was able to practically write the news; TV relations also easier, b/c of regulatory control (FCC) and fewer executives (than newspapers); historical perspectives of Pres. press conf.; instituted by Woodrow Wilson, changed by FDR (forum for projecting desired image); Truman regarded media as hostile, didn't use the media; Eisenhower adapted well to TV; lots of press conferences, friendly to reporters (quasi-staff); Kennedy (like FDR) used to sell an image; Johnson hurt by media due to lack of style (credibility gap); Nixon tried to avoid it; June 1969: told Ehrlichman to compile list of friendly reporters, avoided questions from hostile reporters; October 1969: "Rifle & Shotgun" memo (Macgruder); March 1970: all-out attack, FCC monitor networks, antitrust action, IRS investigation of networks and reporters, Republican National Committee letter-writing campaigns; November 1969: Spiro Agnew, very hostile speech in Des Moines; FCC chair requesting transcripts of news coverage of speech; threat of using regulation as a weapon against networks was overt; Nixon campaign strategy applied to media: make enemy bend over backward to appear fair; harassment of Schorr (FBI investigation), Hart (US Information Agency, IRS, forced to leave CBS for NBC); April 1972: DoJ filed antitrust lawsuit against networks (timed for 1972 campaign); October 1972: Nixon told aides not to talk to/invite to functions: NY Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek; November 1972: Clay Whitehead (Dir. of WH office of Telecommunications Policy) told networks (in leadup to election day) that they would be held responsible for biased coverage at license-renewal time; Nixon's presidency paralleled rising importance of media, sought to control media for his own success; inability to control frustrated/alienated Nixon

Book Three: The Watergate War: Origins and Retreat, June 1972-April 1973

Chapter 8: "We should come up with... imaginative dirty tricks." The Watergate Break-in

17 June 1972: Watergate burglars arrested; envelope w/ check connected E. Howard Hunt to burglars; FBI file on Hunt mentioned Caddy, lawyer who showed up to represent 5 burglars (even though they made no calls); retiring Presidential aide Harry Dent watching TV, "It's all over" (suspected CRP-WH-Haldeman-RN link); afternoon, 17 June 1971: McCord is ex-CIA, head of security for CRP; 18 June 1971: Mitchell denied burglars operating on behalf of CRP; 19 June 1971: FBI learned Hunt was ex-CIA, had worked for Colson in WH in late March; 23 June: FBI Dir. Gray: Watergate has highest priority investigative attention; President/Haldeman tried using CIA blanket to cover up from FBI; 19 June: Ziegler refused to comment; 20 June: Colson, Hunt, McCord names and CRP/WH connection public knowledge; Larry O'Brien press conference re $1 million Democratic lawsuit against CRP; 22 June: Nixon: WH has no involvement in this particular incident; 25 June: O'Brien called for special prosecutor to investigate; 30 June: meeting with RN, H, Mitchell: Mitchell resignation, plan was for Mitchell to take the fall; 1 August: Mitchell resigned for family reasons; cut to September 1971: when Mitchell made CRP chair, Haldeman memo stating H would be contiuit btwn RN and Mitchell to insulate RN from CRP but maintain control; Mitchell formally took post in February 1972; late 1971: Mitchell asked Dent to work for him; Dent expressed skepticism, Mitchell insisted he was in control, WH stepped in and appointed Magruder (Haldeman aide) instead; President maintained control over all minute details; saddled McGovern with albatross of ultra-left-wing allies (similar to Goldwater's ultra-right-wing albatross); July/August 1972: Nixon continued pursuing Larry O'Brien information, countersuit by CRP of Democrats accusing them of libel; 1972 insulation tactic had advantage of incumbency; RN remained off campaign trail, unconnected in public to CRP; no debate/face-to-face between RN and McGovern; RN claimed the "dirty tricks" were simply turning Democratic tactics against them (memoirs); CRP: RN control of it in place by 1971; Nixon: pattern of illegal/illicit behavior (1962gov. campaign, postcards w/o acknowledgment of funding from Nixon campaign); CRP operations (townhouse, Sandwedge, Gemsone, etc.); Sandwedge = offensive intelligence & illegal behavior/tactics; Mitchell dismissed as unrealistic; Watergate break-in diminished in importance, important things became pattern of illegal activities and cover-up, which led to more abuses of executive power; connection between Hunt, Liddy, 5 burglars, & CRP was there, but unclear; 4 theories:

(1) Colson's mastermind plot, plan for widespread violence @ RNC, martial law, after burglars caught, Colson's plan concealed and rest of WH implicated

(2) After the Keith decision required Administration to disclose wiretaps, break-in was not to find faulty taps from 1st break-in but to remove wiretaps in anticipation of Court's announcement of ruling, scheduled for that Monday

(3) CIA connections, due to Nixon's plan to strip CIA of many of its powers; CIA may have been trying to sabotage Nixon

(4) CIA-Democrats call-girl operation, McCord sabotaged operation to prevent call-girl prostitution ring from being uncovered

O'Brien-Howard Hughes connection became Nixon obsession; another theory was due to Greek connection; Greek KYP (started, subsidized by CIA) transferred 3 cash payments ($549k total) to Nixon campaign via Pappas (1968); Pappas provided business contacts/donors and cash for Mitchell "special projects"; contributed to Watergate burglars via CIA front (payoffs for silence); whistleblower against Pappas threatened with deportation, harassed; 15 September 1972: indictment of Hunt, Liddy, 5 burglars handed down; FBI interviews done with CRP lawyers/John Dean present, against standard policy; interview policies set by FBI director Gray; ineffectiveness of interviews due to lawyers being present; reluctance/silence of interviewees; FBI efforts to move beyond 7 met resistance; investigative reports (FBI) forwarded to Dean by Gray; later surfaced that Gray had helped Dean by destroying evidence from Hunt's WH safe, materials given to him by Dean

Chapter 9: "What really hurts is if you try to cover it up." Watergate and the Campaign of 1972

15 September 1972: Grand Jury returned indictment of 7 burglars, Justice Dept. spokesman: "highly unlikely" investigation would be extended beyond 7; May 1970: John Dean working for Mitchell in DoJ, Magruder mentioned Dean to Haldeman, Krogh (friend of Dean's) offered him job in WH; Haldeman offered Dean the job of WH Counsel, Dean accepted; Dean didn't see the President much; Dean young, not experienced, ambitious and willing; Ehrlichman moved from WH Counsel to head Domestic Council; Dean was conduit between FBI/Secret Service & WH for antiwar demonstrations Dean stonewalled General Accounting Office on CRP inquiries, invoked executive privilege; after Watergate, Dean interviewed Wh staff, learned that Haldeman had received wiretap logs; saw connection to President, orchestrated parties to Watergate coverup; 17 June: Mitchell denied involvement; 19 June: Colson encouraged confiscation of Hunt's WH safe; Mitchell suggested Magruder burn Gemstone files; 20 June: Haldeman told Strachan to clean files, Strachan shredded files; Dean & associate Fielding went thru safe, found evidence of dirty tricks, Plumbers memos, informed Ehrlichman, who told Dean to "deep six" them; Dean gave them to Gray; Dean gradually assumed control of Watergate coverup; assigned to the coverup task by H; Dean's DoJ connections meant Dean was trusted in the DoJ, was not known to be the lynch pin of the sconspiracy; 20 June: Nixon learned of Hunt/Liddy CRP connection, did not inform FBI; talked to H abt raising money for burglars, using CIA to put pressure on FBI to drop investigation; this was date of 18.5-minute gap in tape; 23 June: Nixon, H took steps to cover up links between burglars, CRP, WH: this constituted obstruction of justice; President not sure who devised break-in plan, suspected Liddy ("a little nuts"); worreid the FBI would trace the money with the burglars; H said FBI had enough evidence w/o following the money; Helms mystified by insinuation of money laundering by CIA - said it was fictional, the CIA can get money from anywhere in the world, don't need to launder money; summer 1972: Helms said he was being set up to take the fall by the President; eventual resistance of Helms against Nixon led to much greater exposure of the CIA, and political scrutiny; between 17 June and 15 September, Dean and Nixon met once; 29 August: press conf. by Nixon, refused to hire special prosecutor, cited Dean's investigation and FBI investigation and House Banking & Currency Committee (HBCC) investigation; 15 September: meeting with Nixon, H, John Dean; Dean keeping track of different Watergate problems; D, H, N thought indictment of the 7 woudl be the end of the affair; Dean mentioend that HBCC could be a problem; proposed investigating campaign finance laws broken by HBCC committee members; Nixon wanted Sen. Garry Brown and House Minority Leader Ford to meet with Ehrlichman; Dean left, would not meet with President until 28 February 1973; Patman (head of HBCC) was very shrewd, loner, had long-term view of things; 21 June: Sen. Proxmire asked for Fed. Reserve Board Chair's cooperation in seeking names of banks involved in issuing cash found on burglars; fed. attorneys learned Barker (burglar) withdrew $89k (cash) from acct (money deposited in April by a Mexican bank); July/August reports: Dahlberg check, $25k; FBI following money trail; 22 August: GAO said they woudl no longer cooperate w/ HBCC investigation; 29 August: in Nixon's press conf. in CA, question abt special prosecutor went unanswered, Nixon claims of campaign finance violations by both sides; 28 August: Patman requested interview with Stans; 30 August: Stans agreed to interview, was interviewed same day; 4 September: Republican response to Patman, focusing on rights of Stans, burglars, Republicans refused to cooperate, led by Garry Brown; 5 September: Stans denied any knowledge during questioning; 11 September: Stans' lawyer refused to appear at HBCC meeting, on civil rights basis; FBI: w/o leak from insider, investigation would fail; 12 September: HBCC staff report about Nixon campaign contributions on 5 April (2 days before campaign finance laws took effect) ready, leaked to public; Patman accused Stans of participating in cover-up; Patman saw Stans as key connection between CRP and burglary; 3 October: committee was assembled, Patman requested subpoena powers, effort was sabotaged by 2 Democrats due to WH pressure; 26 September: Parkinson (CRP Finance Committee's/Stans' lawyer) sent Dean list of campaign finance reports/PAC connections of HBCC Senators; one senator (Brasco) dissenting against subpoena power, from NY, met earlier with Mitchell and NYC Democratic leader to discuss his HBCC role, and had been under investigation since 1970 for bribery/fraud; in Ford's VP confirmation hearing (1973), Ford asked if he had influenced Patman Committee, Ford said no (despite 15 September conversation where Nixon said Ford had to lead, said Ehrlichman should meet with Ford); 1974 impeachment hearings: a count of obstruction of justice for role in blocking Patman committee; 12 October: Patman invited Mitchell, MacGregor, Stans, Dean to testify; none showed, so Patman held mock hearing; 31 October: released HBCC report linking CRP to burglars; 12 October: Washington Post published story on Segrettin's "dirty tricks" campaign; President knew Kalmbach had paid Segretti; Dean knew Segretti would lead to H, Chapman, and Kalmbach, and eventually to President; Patman and Ervin (Senate Select Committee investigating 1972 campaign financing) cooperated, Patman shared info with Ervin, directed him on questioning Dean; 5 October: press conference, Nixon took civil rights approach, not commenting on burglars' case; 5 October: Stans fundraiser raised $6.5-7 million in 1 night (set record for political fundraiser); March 1973: Haldeman to Colson: Dean is handling Watergate, should handle all questions/input; December 1972: Dean attempted redefinition of WH Cousel role (measure of Dean's importance)

Chapter 10: "The cover-up is the main ingredient." A Blackmailer, a Senator, and a Judge: November 1972-March 1973

WH enemies beginning to see Watergate as more than simple burglary; 8 November: day after election, Haldeman demanded everyone's resignation in a meeting of assembled WH staff and Cabinet; late November: CiA director Helms forced to resign, became ambassador of Iran; 17 February: Gray nomination went to Senate, disaster for Nixon, gave Democratic Congress chance to ask about Watergate; December 1972: N, H, E discussed Segretti's "dirty tricks" campaign, agreed it was unconnected to Watergate; Chapman, Strachan (Haldeman aide) dismissed (knew too much); two cover-ups: CRP-Watergate connection, and cover-up to protect President; October 1972: Hunt started calling Colson, making demands; November 1972: Colson told Hunt he didn't know about Watergate; concern by defendants about expenses; Hunt: "Your cheapest commodity available is money"; blackmail of WH by Hunt; 27 November: deadline for WH to meet its financial committments; Liddy asked Dean for money for a lawyer; 15 November: Pres. to H: Colson doesn't fit, eager to dismiss; Colson stayed several months anyway; fed President's "dark side"; 8 December: Hunt's wife (also CIA, savvy, had the whole picture) died in plane crash (as did CBS news correspondent Michele Clark and Illinois Congressman George Collins); $10k in her purse, $225k in flight insurance payable to Howard Hunt taken out shortly before flight; FBI was looking for evidence the plane was sabotaged; Hunt seen as non-expendable witness; 14 February: Nixon and Colson: "The cover-up is the main ingredient... This tremendous investigation rests, unless one of the seven begins to talk."; Mitchell stonewalling investigation; 6 January: Senator Mansfield called for Watergate investigation by Senate committee; 25 February: Nixon told H, E to stay out of Watergate, leave it to Dean, Kleindienst; Nixon to Dean: Chambers, Hiss's accuser, suffered greatly because he was an informer (pointed advice for Dean); 10 January: trial of Hunt, Liddy, 5 burglars began in D.C.; Judge Sirica; prosecution kept case narrow; 11 January: Hunt pleaded guilty to 6 counts; 15 January: 4 Cubans pled guilty to all counts; NY Times reported defendants had been pressured to plead guilty; 30 January: jury returned all guilty counts against McCord and Liddy (90 minutes of deliberation); 11 January: DoJ filed charges against CRP for campaign finance violations; Mansfield, Ervin kept Watergate issue from dying; 11 February: President to H: have to discredit the hearings (Ervin committee); author draws parallel between Charles I and his opposition to Oliver Cromwell; Charles lost his head/his crown, Nixon put his office in jeopardy and lost; 23 March: sentencing for Watergate burglars; 20 March: McCord letter to judge, also published by LA Times, revealing that pressure applied to defendants to plead guilty; McCord acted to reduce his sentence, take focus away from CIA (was ex-CIA); Gray nomination also heating up, Gray-Dean cooperation uncovered; Sirica: used maximum sentences to pressure self-incrimination/testimony before Senate committee; John Mitchell determined (by President and his closest aides) to be the sacrificial lamb

Chapter 11: "We have a cancer within, close to the Presidency." Covering Up the Cover-Up: January-March 1973

January 1973: Hunt demanding money, Ervin Senate committee investigating, Gray confirmation hearing leading toward Dean's involvement, uncovering Dean's dealings w/ Oval Office; 20 March 1973: Dean to Moore (President's special counsel): cover-up can't be maintained much larger; 21 March: Dean to Nixon: release some pressure on investigation; launching of cover-up of cover-up, and finding people to take the heat; 17 Feb: Gray confirmation hearing launched; end Feb: WH contacts during Watergate inv. acknowledged, sinking Gray's potential; nomination went forward due to lack of alternatives (Gray knew too much); committee learned of reports to Dean, 1 week delay (Dean) in turning over contents of Hunt's WH safe; 13 March; committee voted to have Dean testify; 2 March: press conf. by Nixon, executive privilege to prevent President's counsel from testifying (transformed separation of powers into unbridled autonomy); Nixon memoirs: @ press conference, realized "Vietnam had found its successor."; Ehrlichman to Dean: "let him [Gray] twist slowly[,] slowly in the wind."; Byrd (late March) challenged/questioned Gray on Dean/WH connection, lively had info/contact from inside FBI; 27 March: N, H, E discussed withdraw of Gray's name; 4 April: confirmation that Gray could not be confirmed; 5 April: Gray's name withdrawn; Democrats were eager to kick Gray around; 4 April: Ehrlichman met with Judge Byrne for poss. FBI post; Byrne was not informed of visit's purpose, was presiding over Ellsberg's trial, used event as basis for declaring mistrial later; March 1973: national awareness of Watergate, 478 ?s fielded by Ziegler about Watergate; Nixon began cover-up of cover-up using executive privilege; 13 March: N, H, Dean, discussion of measures to divert attention from Watergate; FBI connection to investigate Dem. Presidents' abuse of FBI; Nixon had given up on Gray; N to Dean: who are particularly vulnerable Ervin Committee witnesses? Sloan (passed money to Liddy), Kalmbach (hush money to burglars); N still did not distinguish between H and Mitchell; 17 March: President needed report from Dean (results of WH Watergate investigation); Dean: Colson and Strachan (H aides) asked for more political intelligence; Dean revealed Ehrlichman's role in Ellsberg cover-up; 21 March: Dean/Nixon: Dean convinced plan/cover-up failing; recited to Nixon: H instructed campaign intelligence operation; Caulfield developed plan, Mitchell/E/D agreed not suitable; Dean suggested commissioning Liddy, Liddy proposed expensive/outlandish schemes, Liddy enlisted Hunt as ally, Liddy + Hunt visited Colson, who pressed Magruder for action; Haldeman via Strachan pressured Magruder for campaign intelligence; Magruder turned to Mitchell for campaign to approve D.N.Committee wiretap plans; Mitchell agreed, wiretaps went to Strachan & Haldeman; Haldeman aware of CRP capacity for illegal ops, but not directing; H did not know source of intelligence (wiretaps), but Strachan did; Dean recapped monitoring/restraint of FBI investigation; Liddy informed Dean defendants needed money for living expenses; Kalmbach to raise money; Kalmbach distributed money to defendants via Hunt's lawyer; this involved H, E, Mitchell, Dean in obstruction of justice; Haldeman authorized use of $350k from his safe; money for living expenses turned into Hunt blackmailing WH ($122k or destroy Ehrlichman); info about Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in; Mitchell had most to lose; Mitchell, LaRue trying to raise money from Pappas; Nixon: how much money do you need? Dean: $1 million over 2 years; N: know where to get $1 million cash; Hunt worried President because of Colson connection; question of "letting it all blow" came up, dropped; both wanted to avoid, b/c damaging to both; Dean encouraged grand jury (G.J.) sacrificing people/immunizing witnesses; possibility of H endictment (Watergate break-in) & E endictment (Ellsberg break-in); Colson, Magruder seen as weak links; Hunt could bring down E, Colson, Mitchell, & then others; President tasked Dean to continue cover-up; N, H, E, D, met in afternoon, Dean pushed G.J. idea b/c of risk of cover-up blowing, endangering President; Dean more exposed due to Gray hearings, E & H beginning to look out for themselves foremost; H & E saw cover-up as most advantageous (most heat on Dean); (night) 21 March 1973: Colson told President that Sen. Howard Baker (R-TN) willing to work with Nixon; Colson suggested President hire special prosecutor; N recording thoughts @ end of day; Magruder's lack of character, & Haldeman's mistake hiring him; focus on Colson's insistence Magruder/Liddy gain intelligence about Democrats; 21 March-April spent preparing Mitchell to take fall; strategy originated from 20 March discussion (N/H) after learning abt McCord letter; Liddy would stay silent, others would be silenced w/ money, executive privilege to protect aides, but Ehrlichman exposed due to Ellsberg break-in; Haldeman worried about Chapin and Strachan connections; 22 March: N/H; H briefed N on use of $350k from safe used to pay defendants; H via D to Strachan to Larue (Mitchell's aide at CRP); President agreed to blackmail payments; WH "circling wagons", increasingly looking like Mitchell would take the heat (CRP, insulated from WH); H, E both began to push for Mitchell to take fall, despite knowledge he would take significant fall; N: "They'll kill him... They'll convict him."; 22 March (2 PM): N, H, E, D, Mitchell; Mitchell pushed N to use executive privilege aggressively; Mitchell proposed coming out with WH version of events; Dean Report, Dean would spent weakened @ Camp David to write report/account of events, Dean kept away from testifying before Ervin committee due to vulnerability; end of meeting conclusion: push executive privilege, use Dean Report as shield; 3 days after Sirica read McCord letter in court: NY Times reported McCord implicated WH & CRP officials, had more info to share, 27 March; Bob Woodward requested interview w/ President via Assistant Press Secretary; H: Magruder claiming intelligence op. orig. from WH, organized by Dean & Haldeman; H & E: Dean not involved, H just wanted better intelligence; Magruder eager to clear himself; Magruder (led to) Mitchell; US Attorney offer of immunity to Magruder to get Mitchell; Dean: no report, b/c would implicate everyone/tighten noose; Dean knew cover-up was blown, hired criminal lawyer

Chapter 12: "We have to prick the Goddam boil and take the heat." Cutting Loose: April 1973

Liddy refused to answer Ervin Committee's questions; McCord began talking to prosecutors; McCord: roles of Mitchell, Dean, Magruder, Colson in Watergate; March-April led to large increase in Watergate stories; 5 April: Dean's laywers in touch w/ prosecutors; N, H, E, worried about Magruder; N to E: Magruder would only pull plug on Mitchell, not H; H dispatched Higby (Haldeman's Haldeman) to talk to Magruder; Magruder said H had nothing to worry about, Magruder only implicated Mitchell, D, & Liddy; Magruder confined Watergate to Mitchell/CRP, no WH involvement; N, H, E used opportunity to pin all blame on Mitchell; E convinced Dean would limit his testimony to Magruder/Mitchell, Dean's testimony increased scope beyond Magruder's; 14 April: E wanted Mitchell and Dean to take fall; President told E to call Mitchell, persuade to take responsibility; (after lunch) 14 April: Magruder "Everybody involved here is going to blow"; question of what WH connections would be revealed (Strachan->Haldeman); Mitchell beside the point; E met w/ Mitchell @ WH, each of President's men had enough info to implicate the others; 5 PM, 14 April: E reported Magruder would implicate Mitchell & Dean (coaching on perjured testimony); Nixon: began to suspect Dean as threat; prosecutors on Dean's trail, looking into Haldeman's links to wiretap intelligence; question of sacrificing Haldeman came up; (later) 14 April: Pres. diary entry; H potentially sacrificed b/c of wiretap intelligence, E b/c of links to Plumbers, Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in; word of felons (McCord, Hunt) vs word of money-raisers re the obstruction of justice charge (unless there was "some piece of paper that somebody signed or some God damned thing..."); Nixon realized Dean was greater threat than Magruder; by this point Dean's lawyers met w/ prosecutors several times; Dean met with them 8 April; initial focus on Magruder, Mitchell; expanded to H, E, Fielding break-in; escalated to President when Dean was convinced he was to be made a scapegoat; Peterson (Assistant AG) informed Kleindienst of Dean's testimony (meeting w/ Titus, US Attorney, & Silbert, Titus aide); 15 April: Nixon, Kleind. met, discussed Dean's testimony (did not implicate President); K surprised N took news of Mitchell's involvement in break-in so calmly; later said credits N w/ more principles than he had, wasn't skeptical enough; N knew where K's info coming from; N, H convinced Mitchell wouldn't have to resign, would be indicted, that "big fish" would take away most of heat/attention; H, E turned sharply on Dean; suggested Dean submit resig. letter, signed, for President's drawer; April 15: Nixon called Petersen 4 times, gave him attention; April 16: met w/ Petersen (Assistant AG under Kleindienst) to get info, learned Dean would not plead guilty w/o indictment of H, E; Petersen kept Nixon informed, e.g. who would be questioned; met w/ H, E, and they pushed case against Dean, that he stonewalled, shot down, dug in his heels; next Nixon met with Dean, presented him w/ a choice: resignation letter or leave of absence letter; Dean insisted H, E do the same, told Nixon they weren't problem-free; still treated Dean like Dean could magically fix situation, told each other taht they had triggered the investigation and had done through investigation; Nixon told Dean to tell the truth; Garmet told President he could not save himself w/o sacrificing H, E; Nixon prodded Petersen to block Ervin's investigation, as to not jeopardize the government's case; Petersen advised letting H go, Nixon insisted it was entirely Mitchell; (H had knowledge of break-in budgets); Dean told Nixon (April 16 afternoon) that he woudl not be a scapegoat; Nixon began to realize he had to sacrifice H, E as part of cover-up of cover-up; April 17: Presidential speech about major developments, Ziegler made "inoperative" statement; Petersen informed Nixon of Dean's testimony about E, Gray, suppression of evidence, that H, E would be unindicted co-conspirators; Nixon met w/ H, E's lawyers; E subtly threatened to talk if let go, Nixon overtly offered cash payments; Nixon tried to line up alabis, plan became to make Dean scapegoat; April 25, E had to take leave of absence due to Ellsberg trial; NY Times obtained info on E/Gray/Dean "deep six" of evidence; prosecutors learned of Kalmbach payments ($154k) to Howard Hunt; Dean's credibility increased; Dean implicated President; Peterson warned Nixon not to try and separate H, E from Dean; NY Times reported on destruction of evidence (28 June 1972 meeting), Dean insisting it was unrelated to Watergate, Gray destroyed @ FBI HQ; Dean informed prosecutors of incident mid-June; Gray: perjury; Ruckelshaus appointed head of FBI; 22 April: Kleindienst decided to submit resignation (27 = Fri, 30 = Monday); Nixon met w/ H, E on 29 April, demanded their resignations, also ordered Kleindienst to submit his resignation; "clean sweep" appearance: announce resignations of H, E, Klein. @ once; 30 April, addressed nation re resignations; several days later, Dean started to tell prosecutors more about Nixon's activities

Book Four: The Watergate War: Disarray and Disgrace, May 1973-August 1974

Chapter 13: New Enemies. The Special Prosecutor and the Senate Committee: May 1973

Declining popular support for Richard Nixon; indictment of H, E, Mitchell, Dean, Magruder, LaRue; Haig replaced Haldeman (4 May); Haig resented by military, asserted authority (opposite of Haldeman), Elliot Richard new AG; calls for special prosecutor had to be addressed, several candidates; Richardson selected Archibald Cox, Harvard Law Sch. Professor, liberal, &c.; Byrd/Senate inquired about Cox relationship to Richardson during Richardson's confirmation hearings; 31 May: Cox assigned/directed to investigate all possible offenses, not just those related to Watergate break-in; Cox appeared to take over the compromised/weak DoJ investigated; US Attorney's office surrendered control of case, and charges were clear, while evidence was lacking (task remaining was to gather/assemble evidence); Cox established FBI connection to bypass AG; Cox saw Ervin Senate Committee as rival, even when committee offered Cox its support; Democrats on COmmittee were united/organized, low-profile Senators; Republicans were disorganized, media-hogs; Dash (Counselor) had more experience than Thompson (Minority Counsel); TV coverage limited to public TV, major networks had only limited coverage (loss of profit when covering Watergate); 22 May: President reversed position on executive privilege, said he would cooperate; Pres. was losing ability to challenge Congress; Administration task was to control/limit information; Kleindienst argument for exec. priv. was separation of powers, but carried to extreme of independent spheres of gov. ignoring each other; Nixon faced two-front war, vs. Special Prosecutor Cox and vs. Senate Select Committee

Chapter 14: "What did the President know, and when did he know it?" The Senate Committee: Summer 1973

17 May: Ervin began Senate Select Committee; limelight went to Congressional hearing; only restrictions on Congressional committees are those placed by Congressmen; Ervin Committee focus: impoundment of COngressional funds & executive prif.; generally abt executive power; Republican fissures; 1st witness: Robert Odle (CRP dir. of administration); McCord testified that break-in approved by Mitchell and Dean, uncertain of nature of operation; 18 May: date of McCord testimony; related WH pressure not to talk, from Howard Hut, John Caulfield; John Caulfield testified he was protecting Nixon, more important than law; committee support for Nixon came out during testimonies; Anthony Ulasewicz testified he had been accessory to obstruction of justice; 24 May: Bernard Barker testified he saw break-in as way to liberate Cuba from Communism; 2-week break to prepare case; public attention increasing; 5 June: resumed, Hugh Sloan: $250k to Kalmbach, $350k to Gordon Strachan (Haldeman aide), Liddy requested $38k, Stans said neither he nor Sloan wanted to know what for, Sloan resigned approx. 1 mo. later; Herbert Porter (CRP scheduling director): testified about peer pressure, got $69k from Sloan for Liddy (on request of Magruder); 12 June: Maurice Stans testimony; Porter, Sloan, Stans set stage for Magruder testimony (CRP deputy director, WH go-between); granted immunity by Judge Sirica, Magruder implicated Dean, Mitchell, LaRue, Strachan in Watergate cover-up; testified breaking law was acceptable b/c other side was too; Brezhnev visit to US, committee closed, Soviets bewildered by process; 25 June: Dean testimony (1 week); described WH atmosphere of need for political intelligence and concern about political enemies; described cover-up & his role in it, 15 September meeting, Nixon's role, etc; challenged Administration's image & integrity; WH tried to portray Dean as center of conspiracy, protecting Mitchell; 28 June: Barker: what did the President know & when did he know it?, intended to discredit Dean, wanted to show his knowledge was heresay/circumstantial, Dean counterattacked, testimony done by 29 June; 11 day adjournment by Committee for 4 July; 3 July: Nixon indirectly revealed he had considered resigning; 12 July: committee met to consider Nixon position, Nixon hospitalized, put off discussion; Magruder, Dean implicated Nixon's aides & (in turn) Nixon; Mitchell testified 3 days, stonewalled committee, referred to Huston Plan and Plumbers as "White House horrors," broadened perspective beyond, Watergate incident, activities required cover-up strategy; Mitchell didn't inform Nixon b/c didn't want to involve him, not concerned w/ the truth; Ervin: Mitchell put Nixon's political fortunes above his responsibility to executive/enforce laws; 13 July: private questioning of Alexander Butterfield; he had intimate knowledge of President's day-to-day activities; revealed existence of taping system in W.H. Oval Office/Camp David/etc; shift in momentum w/ revelation of tapes; 16 July: President ordered Secret Service not to testify; 23 July: subpoena of President ordered by Committee, Nixon rejected subpoena 3 days later; Kalmbach, LaRue, Ulasewicz testified after Butterfield about role in hush money; 24 July-1 August: Haldeman and Ehrlichman testified; Ehrlichman was very hostile to committee, pushed WH perspective that Dem. was protecting Mitchell, cover up his own involvement; maintained Plumbers were legal under President's constitutional powers, Fielding break-in and Ehrlichman's role came up, E claimed it was covert investigation; Ervin: pitted himself as defender of constitution, Administration as usurping power (executive privilege, inherent powers, impoundment of funds); testimony ended 30 July; Haldeman very formal/courteous; depicted Nixon as insulated from responsibility for low-level decisions/insulated from Watergate; depicted Dean as disconnected from Pres.; committee learned that he had access to tapes, did not see why he did and committee did not; committee set H up for later perjury charges when he lied abt tape contents; 2 Aug. and later: prominent witnesses; Helms (CIA), Gray (FBI), Kleindienst, Hunt; Oct./November: next phase of hearings; focused on campaign finances & practices; polls showed decline of Nixon support in summer 1973; deterioration of position due to domestic (farm subsidies, Social Security, minimum wage) and foreign (Cambodia) issues

Quotes

Book One

Chapter 1

[In the 1964 campaign,] Johnson had a veritable monopoly on the peace corner. Speaking in Eufaula, Oklahoma, on September 25, he could not resist gilding the lily: "There are those that say you ought to go North and drop bombs, to try to wipe out supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved... with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia." In the meantime, Barry Goldwater was the candidate who reputedly wanted to "lob one into the men's room in the Kremlin."

In retrospect, Johnson complained that "that bitch of a war" took him away from "the woman I really loved" - his Great Society. The war ruptured the nation, sparking unprecedented anger and resistance to government policies.

Clark Clifford, one of the few men Johnson held in awe, warned in July 1965 that the war was futile. "I don't believe we can win in South Vietnam," he said. "If we send in 100,000 more men, the North Vietnamese will meet us. If North Vietnam runs out of men, the Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and China don't intend for us to win the war." Clifford urged that we get out "honorably." Otherwise, he warned, "I can't see anything but catastrophe for my country."

"There will be some Nervous Nellies and some who will become frustrated and break ranks under the strain," the President remarked. There would be those who would "turn on their leaders and on their country and on our fighting men. There will be times of trial and tensions in the days ahead that will exact the best that is in all of us."

Johnson's patriotic homilies were inadequate. George Washington, at Valley Forge in 1778, warned that whoever built upon patriotism as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war "will find themselves deceived in the end." Such a war, Washington insisted, could never be sustained by patriotism alone. "It must be aided by a prospect of Interest or some reward. For a time, it may, of itself push Men to action; ...but it will not endure unassisted by Interest." Nevertheless, Johnson and his advisers "wrapped themselves in the flag," decrying the "Nervous Nellies" who opposed the war. Deception and self-delusion alike pervaded the Johnson Administration's conduct of the war.

Johnson was described by a contemporary as "king of the river and a stranger to the sea." He was a clever navigator of the congressional stream, paddling deftly through its pools and eddies, ever alert for the occasional sandbar. But in the open sea of foreign policy, with its shifting, almost imperceptible currents, its swells and tempests - there he was out of his depth. He could not be the master he wished to be, and this only embittered and frustrated him more. What he knew best did not apply in these unpredictable waters. International politics was not domestic politics writ large.

The history of presidential power is a history of aggrandizement; the transformation of the office in the twentieth century alone has been remarkable. Economic dislocation, global wars, and the assumption of world leadership have focused power in the presidency, and with it the rapt attention of a fascinated, often adoring, public.

Chapter 2

"Show me a good loser, and I'll show you a loser."

- Wallace Newman, Nixon's football coach at Whittier

More tellingly and more cuttingly, [Adlai] Stevenson derided Nixon as a comic figure, describing him as the "kind of politician who would cut down a redwood tree, then mount the stump for a speech on conservation."

"He worked like a horse and learned the law," [Leonard] Garment recalled, comparing Nixon's effort to starting "athletic life by doing the Olympic decathlon."

Chapter 3

The important, sustained revolution came from within the ranks of what had been the dominant political coalition. The "risen" middle class, the blue- and white-collar workers, and ethnics who had nourished the growth of the Democratic majority, now found themselves unhappy with the young protesters who were the new cohabitants of its political home. The protesters' challenges to cherished views of the American way of life, the criticisms of what was wrong with America, left the "old-fashioned Democrats" confused, shaken, and above all frightened, especially as events took a violent turn. Whatever their own disenchantment with the Vietnam war, they hardly identified themselves with the public expressions of outrage by disaffected groups. A political alliance between protesters and conventional Democrats simply was improbable. The latter had little sympathy fo the blacks and dispossessed who, in their minds, had not worked to achieve the American Dream. Their disdain, even contempt, for the alienated young campus radicals was as powerful. After all, these were the spoiled, pampered, comfortable children of those above - or even their own ungrateful offspring.

"Things have come to some pass when a Republican candidate for President has to take counsel with his advisers about whether he should attend the funeral of a Nobel Prize winner."

- Leonard Garmet, Nixon's law partner, 1968

Perhaps there was no New Nixon - just new perceptions. Howard Phillips, a militant conservative who had idolized Nixon since his teen years, believed that the man never really changed. Speaking in the last days of the Nixon Administration in 1974, as he issued a "conservative manifesto" calling for the President's resignation, and at a time when talk of a New Nixon had faded and the Old Nixon appeared very much restored, Phillips said: "Throughout his public career, Mr. Nixon has always tried to please his audience, seeking their confidence and admiration by becoming the man he thinks they want him to be. The changing perceptions of Nixon - the New Nixon, the Old Nixon, the statesman, the strategist - do not reflect a change in the man but in the audience to which he is at any moment appealing."

Book Two

Chapter 4

"It was all warm and friendly until... Bob Haldeman arrived."

- Rose Mary Woods, Nixon's personal secretary since 1951

Compartmentalization ensured fragmentation of power, precisely what Nixon desired. (Of course, the technique was not new; Franklin D. Roosevelt was a past master at such administrative dealings.)

"I've always thought this country could run itself domestically without a President," Nixon said in 1967. "All you need is a competent Cabinet to run the country at home. You need a President for foreign policy; no Secretary of State is really important; the President makes foreign policy." This oft-repeated mark implied that Nixon really had little interest in domestic affairs and was prepared to allow a "competent Cabinet" to run its own course. Nothing was further from the truth. In his eyes, the Cabinet was only an extension of Richard Nixon and the Oval Office; he well realized how domestic affairs intersected with political and public-relations considerations which in turn vitally affected his public standing.

John F. Kennedy's aide and biographer, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., recalled many instances of his and Kennedy's frustration in getting the bureaucracy to respond to policy directives... "the President use to divert himself with the dream of establishing a secret office of thirty people or so to run foreign policy while maintaining the State Department as a facade in which people might contentedly carry papers from bureau to bureau." (Ironically, that was precisely the system that Nixon and Kissinger installed.)

Chapter 5

Haldeman selected a number of people on various lists for IRS audits and other forms of harassment. Washington Post lawyer Edward Bennett Williams was targeted. Williams at first regarded the attention as a "badge of honor"; on more sober reflection, he realized how dangerous it was to have the "President of the United States obsessed with the idea of wreaking some kind of revenge against me." The IRS audited him for three consecutive years.

Significantly, the Court decisively rejected Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's argument that the release of the papers would affect lives, the recovery of Vietnam prisoners of war, and the peace process. Those considerations, he argued, had "such an effect on the security of the United States that [they] ought to be the basis of an injunction in this case." The Justices thought not, but their surface unanimity masked deep feelings. Some, like Justice Hugo Black, in what proved to be his final judicial opinion, bitterly assailed the Administration and the courts for permitting even a temporary injunction. Chief Justice Warren Burger dutifully defended the Administration, however, and Justice Byron White expressed biting contempt for Ellsberg's action and urged that the government prosecute him under the ordinary criminal statutes.