In Sputnik's Shadow

In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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What had shaped the relationship between scientists and the state  in history in different cultural and national contexts? What should be the proper  role of science in a democratic society?

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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What I have found, as I have tried to argue  in the book, is that the most important contribution of PSAC was not its advice  to the government on what technology could do, but, rather, what it could not  do. It is this sense of technological skepticism, I believe, that we still need in our  own age of global technological enthusiasm and renewed American militarism if  we are to prevent future Great Leap Forwards and escape the various shadows  of Sputnik.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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"You know, Jim, this bunch of scientists  was one of the few groups that I encountered in Washington who seemed to be  there to help the country and not help themselves. "4 In Eisenhower's eyes, PSAC  appeared not only free of self-interest, but also a "good" scientific-technological  elite that presented a counterbalance to the military-industrial complex that he  would warn the nation of shortly in his famous farewell address.'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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"You know, Jim, this bunch of scientists  was one of the few groups that I encountered in Washington who seemed to be  there to help the country and not help themselves. "4 In Eisenhower's eyes, PSAC  appeared not only free of self-interest, but also a "good" scientific-technological  elite that presented a counterbalance to the military-industrial complex that he  would warn the nation of shortly in his famous farewell address.' To what extent  this perception corresponded to the reality of PSAC and American politics of science   is a question of more than historical interest. As we enter a new era of technological   enthusiasm, we need more than ever to scrutinize the historical forces  still shaping our perceptions of what science and technology can and cannot do  for social progress.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The illusion of technological fixes, PSAC scientists believed, often led to  not only a waste of societal resources on impractical developmental projects, such  as the si billion failure to make a nuclear-powered airplane, but also, sometimes,  dangerously misguided public policy, such as the perilous arms race and later the  war in Vietnam. Thus, with any given project, the allure of the technological  imperative must be tempered with a critical, independent evaluation of both its  technical limitations and policy implications. Has the necessary basic research  been completed and the project's technical feasibility been proven before going  into costly production?

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The illusion of technological fixes, PSAC scientists believed, often led to  not only a waste of societal resources on impractical developmental projects, such  as the si billion failure to make a nuclear-powered airplane, but also, sometimes,  dangerously misguided public policy, such as the perilous arms race and later the  war in Vietnam. Thus, with any given project, the allure of the technological  imperative must be tempered with a critical, independent evaluation of both its  technical limitations and policy implications. Has the necessary basic research  been completed and the project's technical feasibility been proven before going  into costly production? Has it passed a rigorous cost-benefit analysis? Can it fulfill  its stated mission and, most important of all, does that mission make sense in the  context of broad, long-term policy considerations?

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Most also had supported J. Robert Oppenheimer  and James Conant in their tumultuous conflict with physicists Edward Teller and  Ernest Lawrence over the H-bomb in late 1949•

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Clearly not all American scientists subscribed to PSAC's technological skepticism.   As perhaps the most prominent nuclear physicist of the day, Teller, for example,   was conspicuously missing from the committee roster. Indeed, he would often  make a formidable one-man anti-PSAC not only by battling the committee's various  arms control proposals but also by advocating technological fixes, especially nuclear  energy, in all areas of national life. As a popular joke among physicists went, "You  got a problem? Eddie's got a bomb."7

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The split in the scientific community, which can  be traced to the hydrogen bomb debate in 1949-1950, was not only over the direction  of American nuclear policy, but also over whether technology offered a solution to  social and political problems.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Eventually, many PSAC scientists came to agree with critics of the war  outside of the committee that the American sense of technological superiority  played a significant part in leading the country into the conflict.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Yes, they consciously tapped into the undercurrent of anxiety in the age of  technological enthusiasm, and their technological critique might have contributed  to the countercultural movement of the late 196os and early 19706 and even the  postmodern questioning of science and technology.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Rationality, to them, should not stop at the technical but should  be extended into the policy arena as well. Thus theirs was not an argument against  technology, but one for appropriate technology, for a broadened concept of technological   rationality that encouraged technological development not for its own  sake but for its benefits in achieving social, political, cultural, and economic goals  in a democratic society.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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By insisting on looking at the "big picture" whenever they examined a particular technology, they abandoned a purely technical approach to the evaluation of technology and adopted instead what historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes calls the systems approach to technology'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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PSAC also deserves our attention as a key institution at the interface between the scientific community and the broader polity during the Cold War.9 As historian
Sally Gregory Kohlstedt argues, institutional histories can be a powerful "point of convergence" of intellectual, social, and cultural history of science." Studies of scientific institutions, including laboratories, academies, and societies, have long held a key place in the history of science and blossomed especially in recent years."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Although PSAC was abolished decades ago and the Cold War has finally ended, the tension between technological enthusiasm and skepticism with which PSAC grappled during the Cold War has not left us.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Instead of showing science's positive contributions toward technological progress, PSAC focused on the role of basic research in evaluating technology, or, more important, in showing the limits of technology.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Thus, basic research was justified not only as a source of new technological initiatives, as Vannevar Bush had argued, but perhaps more important, as a way to prevent the government from going into blind alleys in costly applied research and development.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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in the everyday life of a science adviser in the trench, technical proficiency probably counted more than the scientific discoveries on which the science advisers made their reputations."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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American joke that the Soviets could not sneak a nuclear "suitcase bomb" into the country because they had not perfected the suitcase.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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It led many, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower, to realize that a "total Cold War" had dawned in which science, technology, education, and the pursuit of national prestige ranked with military and economic strengths as vital forces.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Because Sputnik called into question the adequacy of both the government's support for and use of science, PSAC scientists took on both "science in policy" to make science better serve the government's needs and "policy for science" so that the government could support science effectively.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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the

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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providing the United States with a "worthy counterpart" to the Royal Society of London and the French Academy.' Indeed, by the early twentieth century, the NAS had largely evolved into an honorific society of scientific elites, ill prepared to serve the government's needs when another crisis, World War I, came along.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Jewett resented FDR's restrictions of the scientists' role to "details of research problems
of the government departments." "I say this," Jewett continued, "because of a feeling that if my training, experience and judgment were of any value to the scientific departments of the Government that value lies rather in the field of matters of scientific policies which may or may not embrace research, than in the narrower field of research alone ."s'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The 1933 World's Fair ("Century of Progress") in Chicago captured this faith in pure science with its motto: "Science Finds, Industry Applies, and Man Conforms.` Notably, Lewis Mumford, a prominent American public intellectual and one of the fiercest critics of what he called megatechnics, put an important twist on the thesis of scientific superiority when he wrote approvingly in the 1930s about "a liberated scientific curiosity" as "a counterweight to the passionate desire to reduce all existence to terms of immediate profit and success."23

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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'All

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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'All science stopped during the war except the little bit that was done at Los Alamos," recalled Richard Feynman, a talented young group leader at the bomb laboratory during World War II. `And that was not much science," Feynman added, "it was mostly engineering.""

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Furthermore, in the hard times during the Depression, only the most enterprising experimentalists and most talented theoreticians survived the selection process and got to play key roles in the wartime research projects.3°

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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When a naval officer asked Rabi to make a certain radar device but refused to tell him what it was for-"We prefer to talk about this in our swivel chairs in Washington"-Rabi knew exactly what to do: "I didn't say anything. Neither did I do anything." Finally the officers relented and the two sides worked together to produce "a fantastically great radar." Fortunately, Rabi reflected, "our money did not come from the military directly" but from the OSRD.34

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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the question of dual allegiance to science and government had long frustrated American scientists' pursuit for a role in public policy.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Although many scientists continued to concentrate on their science either as a personal preference-Feynman claimed to practice "active irresponsibility"-or

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Science, Mumford insisted, should not only pursue truth for its own sake, but be made to answer the question: "Is it beneficial?", Such public questioning of their responsibility contributed to scientists' resolve "to make science serve the cause of peace"

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Such appeals encouraged scientists to leave the ivory tower or weapons labs, if temporarily, to enter the public sphere and attempt to shape nuclear policy.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The resultant GAC report marked several important departures in the history of science advising. Even more than the Franck Committee, the GAC based its recommendation against the H-bomb on explicitly social, political, and moral considerations: the H-bomb was not a military instrument but a weapon of geno- cide.'9 The majority appendix to the report, drafted by Conant, and cosigned by DuBridge, Rowe, Smith, Buckley, and Oppenheimer, argued that it was both necessary and possible to stop the development of this technology. "Mankind would be far better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon, until the present climate of world opinion changes."3° The minority appendix to the GAC, signed by Rabi and Fermi, condemned the H-bomb even more forcefully, calling it "necessarily an evil thing considered in any light."3'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The resultant GAC report marked several important departures in the history of science advising. Even more than the Franck Committee, the GAC based its recommendation against the H-bomb on explicitly social, political, and moral considerations: the H-bomb was not a military instrument but a weapon of geno- cide.'9 The majority appendix to the report, drafted by Conant, and cosigned by DuBridge, Rowe, Smith, Buckley, and Oppenheimer, argued that it was both necessary and possible to stop the development of this technology. "Mankind would be far better off not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon, until the present climate of world opinion changes."3° The minority appendix to the GAC, signed by Rabi and Fermi, condemned the H-bomb even more forcefully, calling it "necessarily an evil thing considered in any light."3' Thus, in advising the government, the GAC sought to explain not what a technology could do, but rather what it could not do. "[I]t is not a weapon," the committee agreed, "which can be used exclusively for the destruction of material installations of military or semi-military purposes." In other words, it would not help the United States win the Cold War militarily even if it could be made.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Both the majority and the minority views of the GAC enraged its critics. Edward Teller, who firmly believed in the necessity of deterring Soviet aggression with superior American military technology, denounced the GAC for abandoning Oppenheimer's earlier position on a scientist's duty. "The scientist is not responsible for the laws of nature," Teller argued:
It is his job to find out how these laws operate. It is the scientist's job to find the ways in which these laws can serve human will. However, it is not the scientist's job to determine whether a hydrogen bomb should be constructed, whether it should be used, or how it should be used. This responsibility rests with the American people and with their chosen representatives.38

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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President Truman did not share the GAC's moral concern over the development of the H-bomb. Three years ago he had privately dismissed Oppenheimer as a "cry-baby scientist" when the physicist told him that he had blood on his hands in the aftermath of Hiroshima.'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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It reinforced the idea that scientists, as experts, should be strictly "on tap" and not "on top."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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"Either my comments and advice must play an important part in the councils of your administration or I must be free to speak plainly in public on all those matters of science in which I feel that my war experience gives me a duty to speak."3 Soon he left the White House, disillusioned by what he perceived to be Truman's unwillingness to heed outside scientific advice.'

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Although freed from possible military encroachment and left to support basic research, the NSF was forced to accommodate itself to a federal science funding mechanism dominated by the DOD and the AEC. Its budget languished both in the BOB and in Congress, due partly to its detachment from direct defense concerns. This situation would change with Sputnik, but for much of its formative period, the NSF remained an underfunded promise for the future.


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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Remarkably, the key to ODM-SAC'S justification of scientists' role in the government was not what science and technology could contribute directly to the military strength, but their role in shaping planning and policy. "Perhaps the greatest single improvement in the effective use of science in the national defense will lie," the committee argued, "in its use in helping to bring about the increasing clarification of our over-all strategic objectives and priorities, and a greater understanding of where our problems lie and of their relative importance."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Continuing earlier attempts in the same direction, the ODM-SAC'S quest for science in policy implied a concurrent demand for scientists in policy. Such science advisers would not only alert the government about opportunities offered by scientific and technological developments, but also, more important, carry out critical evaluations at the interface between technology and policy so that both the potentials and limits of new technologies could be recognized and incorporated in the making of policy. Such integration of science and scientists in policy would, the committee believed, "serve to reduce waste, confusion and futility in technical development." Finally, the scientists also linked its advice on science in policy with policy for science when the committee contended that such critical technical and policy evaluations would in turn have to rest on "the best available estimates of scientific
fact and technical promise," offering, implicitly, rationale for federal support of scientific research.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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the intensified Cold War abroad and rising anti-Communism at home severely circumscribed the space for the kind of technological skepticism that was first identified with the GAC and then associated with the ODM-SAC.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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At a time when the Truman administration was preoccupied with "fighting tomorrow's wars with tomorrow's weapons," these liberal-moderate scientists' advocacy of critical evaluations of military technology, with its accompanying demand for scientists to play a role in strategic policymaking, generated much less enthusiasm in the government than Edward Teller's fervent promotion of direct scientific and technological contributions to national defense.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Thus the new administration appreciated scientists' critical role in military technology, but it was reluctant to allow them to enter into policymaking.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The ODM-SAC watched in horror as McCarthy's reckless investigations devastated an Army research laboratory at Fort Monmouth and threatened to do the same for MIT's Lincoln Laboratory in December 1953•

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Ironically and tragically, Oppenheimer had foreseen the gathering storm as early as the summer of 1946 when he discussed with Lilienthal the consequences of a Soviet opposition to international control of atomic energy. Speaking in "a really heart-breaking tone," Oppenheimer predicted, in Lilienthal's paraphrase:
This will be construed by us as a demonstration of Russia's warlike intentions. And this will fit perfectly into the plans of that growing number who want to put the country on a war footing, first psychologically, then actually. The Army directing the country's research; Red-baiting; treating all labor organizations, CIO first, as Communist and therefore traitorous, etc."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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Unjustified attacks on scientists "are reducing the morale of important research laboratories and reducing the availability of key scientists for important posts in the Government," DuBridge warned.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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The hearing on Oppenheimer's security clearance before the AEC Personnel Security Board, chaired by Gordon Gray, presented such a rich and fascinating
window on modern American science and politics that it has attracted the attention of various scholars from historians to dramatists. Among the many issues it highlighted was one that has been central in the history of American science advising: the boundary between the technical and the political that defined the proper role of scientists as government advisors. Oppenheimer was attacked not only for giving "wrong" advice on matters such as the hydrogen bomb, but for giving such advice at all.

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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policy-drew not only rebuttal from Oppen- heimer-"Does this mean that a loyal scientist called to advise his Government does so at his peril if he happens to believe in the wisdom of maintaining a proper balance between offensive and defensive weapons?"-but also from other scientists such as Bush, who argued that "Scientists need to be used not as lackeys or underlings but as partners in a great endeavor to preserve our freedoms."

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In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (Zuoyue Wang)
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It was to the president's and the AEC's relief, that the "mass exodus" from weapons laboratories that had been predicted by the ODM-SAC and the AEC's GAC failed to materialize in the wake of the Oppenheimer case.44