From charlesreid1

 
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A note that when you start intercepting packets on the computer with the spoofed MAC address, you should be ready for whatever bandwidth those requests are coming in at - by inserting yourself between the router and the target, you become the bottleneck.
A note that when you start intercepting packets on the computer with the spoofed MAC address, you should be ready for whatever bandwidth those requests are coming in at - by inserting yourself between the router and the target, you become the bottleneck.


=Pauls Security Podcast Wiki Notes=
==Important Caveats About ARP Spoofing==


<pre>
===Restrictions===
Tech Segment: Arp Cache Poisoning Notes


So, for some future technical segments I am researching the best ways in which to Arp cache poison. Below are some interesting notes:
ARP attacks occur at the Network layer, Layer 3, and by nature the attack can only occur from/to computers on the same subnet. While this does mean the attacker must carry out the attack "locally" (network-wise), it also means that an attacker can use a single infected node on a network to attack an entire subnet, meaning attacks can propagate extremely quickly. Given that ARP poisoning also provides the opportunity to inject content into traffic, it makes embedding malicious scripts and installing malware very easy and can cause infections to spread quickly if it is part of a kill chain.


There is a cool program called send_arp (http://insecure.org/sploits/arp.games.html) which does arp cache poisoning. Its pretty simple right, consider the following example:
===Warnings===


    DNS Server: 192.168.1.10
ARP attacks generate a massive amount of traffic, and are easy to spot if the network is being actively monitored or if there are any IDS systems in place. Also, if you try and ARP spoof an entire subnet, that can quickly overwhelm your hardware. Be careful and know what you're doing.
    Attacker: 192.168.1.67
    Victim: 192.168.1.61


./send_arp 192.168.1.10 00:1f:c6:7b:4e:a2 192.168.1.61 00:0c:6e:20:6b:4e
===Optimal Targets===


In this example, 192.168.1.10 is our DNS server, followed by its Mac address. 192.168.1.61 is our victim, followed by its MAC address. The above command sends the arp entry for 192.168.1.10 to 192.168.1.61. In my example, I am tell the client "Hey, your DNS server's MAC address is really 00:1f:c6:7b:4e:a2". This now means that all of that traffic will be forwarded to that mac address. This works great, Windows is the target in my example, and its totally fooled. If I fire up tcpdump, I can see the requests:
Optimal targets for ARP spoofing attacks are unmonitored networks, low-traffic networks, home networks, very trusting people who have little familiarity with technology, let alone security certificates. They're likely to have an older browser without many of the built-in trust mechanisms. Their browser might even have a "Proceed Anyway" button with a checkbox that says "Store this exception permanently." This would mean the HTTP proxy's certificate has been added to the list of servers this computer trusts utterly and absolutely.


16:17:24.561166 IP 192.168.1.61.2073 > 192.168.1.10.53: 3+ A? amazon.com. (28)
===Power of ARP Spoofing===
16:17:24.561179 IP 192.168.1.61.2073 > 192.168.1.10.53: 3+ A? amazon.com. (28)


However, from the client's perspective, things are not-so-happy. Why? Because my attacking hosts IP addreess is not 192.168.1.10, so the IP stack has no idea what to do with the packets. Essentially, we've spoofed layer 2 and didn't tell layer 3. So, even if I am running a DNS server at this point, my machine will not respond. It will only respond to IP traffic sent to 192.168.1.67, its assigned IP address. So, what most of us attacker type people do is enable forwarding in the Linux kernel:
ARP spoofing is only possible on a local network, and is easily detectable. But that doesn't mean it isn't potent - it is a serious flaw that exists in every properly-implemented network stack. It also poses a risk for extending security breaches - if someone can break into a single machine on a subnet, ARP spoofing can be used to compromise the rest of the subnet.


echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
=ARP Poisoning Procedure=


So now the Linux kernel will forward the traffic to 192.168.1.10, and the client can then resolve names and the world is happy again. This works great for intercepting traffic and packet sniffing. However, what do you do if you want to manipulate DNS entries as they are going by? While further research is needed to find the best way to do this on Linux (I was hoping to receive feedback on this one :) Cain & Abel works great for this. They do APR (Arp Poison Routing) which takes care of this routing layer. This allows you to re-write the responses and change entries, screenshot below:
Understand what we're getting into: what kind of network, how many sheep, whether you're MITMing HTTP or HTTPS? Note that if you wish to MITM HTTPS, you should be targeting old browsers, trusting people, and the technologically unsavvy - not enterprise networks and paranoid people.


Then continue: [[MITM Labs/Bettercap SSL Over Wifi]]


So how is this different from the DNS bug that Dan found? Arp cannot cross layer 3 boundries, so you have to be on the same subnet as your victim. However, if you are able to compromise the internal network, you can launch this attack. There are several ways to mitigate, using tools such as arpwatch and even snort has ways to monitor the Arp table. However, I've found that most people do not configure these defenses. This can be a very subtle way to control hosts on the network, and next week we will explore some attacks that will build on this segment.
=Other Notes=


Below are some tools that enable you to do this as well:
[[Man in the Middle/ARP Poisoning/Pauls Security Podcast]]


    dsniff - The "arpspoof" command will let you do this.
=Resources/Links=
    Cain & Abel - A Windows-based tool that will let you do this as well.
</pre>


Designing/implementing more secure ARP variation: http://www.cs.sjsu.edu/faculty/stamp/students/Roney298report.pdf
ARP and ICMP redirection games: http://insecure.org/sploits/arp.games.html


=Flags=
=Flags=

Latest revision as of 20:38, 5 March 2022

ARP = address resolution protocol = the protocol for mapping MAC addresses to IP addresses


Some Background

How ARP Works

This refers to some concepts about network communications protocols covered on the Packet Analysis page.

ARP is a way of using Layer 2 addressing, MAC addresses, with Layer 3 addressing, or IP addresses.

To communicate with other devices on a network, you use their IP addresses. But routers operate on Level 2, MAC addresses. That means that communicating with other devices on a network also requires knowing their MAC address. Getting a MAC address from an IP address is done through ARP.

When computer A is crafting a packet to computer B, it begins by seeing if computer B is in the ARP cache, meaning computer A would already have computer B's MAC address. If not found, computer sends a broadcast packet to FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF and asks for which computer at which IP address owns a particular MAC address.

Computers C, D, and E discard the packet. But the recipient, computer B, crafts a reply with its MAC address with an ARP reply. When computer A receives the reply, it stores that information in the computer's ARP cache.

How ARP Poisoning (Spoofing) Works

This is the process of fooling a switch or router into thinking your computer has a MAC address that it actually doesn't.

One way to use ARP poisoning is to tap the wire of a network, and intercept traffic from a router to a target computer. In this case, you're fooling the router into sending you the traffic instead, and you forward the traffic on to the target computer like nothing ever happened.

Another way to use ARP poisoning is to cause denial of service attacks. In this case, client requests are sent to a router, which then forwards traffic to a particular MAC address at a particular IP address. Except, the destination computer isn't who it's supposed to be, and so isn't ready for the traffic.

A note that when you start intercepting packets on the computer with the spoofed MAC address, you should be ready for whatever bandwidth those requests are coming in at - by inserting yourself between the router and the target, you become the bottleneck.

Important Caveats About ARP Spoofing

Restrictions

ARP attacks occur at the Network layer, Layer 3, and by nature the attack can only occur from/to computers on the same subnet. While this does mean the attacker must carry out the attack "locally" (network-wise), it also means that an attacker can use a single infected node on a network to attack an entire subnet, meaning attacks can propagate extremely quickly. Given that ARP poisoning also provides the opportunity to inject content into traffic, it makes embedding malicious scripts and installing malware very easy and can cause infections to spread quickly if it is part of a kill chain.

Warnings

ARP attacks generate a massive amount of traffic, and are easy to spot if the network is being actively monitored or if there are any IDS systems in place. Also, if you try and ARP spoof an entire subnet, that can quickly overwhelm your hardware. Be careful and know what you're doing.

Optimal Targets

Optimal targets for ARP spoofing attacks are unmonitored networks, low-traffic networks, home networks, very trusting people who have little familiarity with technology, let alone security certificates. They're likely to have an older browser without many of the built-in trust mechanisms. Their browser might even have a "Proceed Anyway" button with a checkbox that says "Store this exception permanently." This would mean the HTTP proxy's certificate has been added to the list of servers this computer trusts utterly and absolutely.

Power of ARP Spoofing

ARP spoofing is only possible on a local network, and is easily detectable. But that doesn't mean it isn't potent - it is a serious flaw that exists in every properly-implemented network stack. It also poses a risk for extending security breaches - if someone can break into a single machine on a subnet, ARP spoofing can be used to compromise the rest of the subnet.

ARP Poisoning Procedure

Understand what we're getting into: what kind of network, how many sheep, whether you're MITMing HTTP or HTTPS? Note that if you wish to MITM HTTPS, you should be targeting old browsers, trusting people, and the technologically unsavvy - not enterprise networks and paranoid people.

Then continue: MITM Labs/Bettercap SSL Over Wifi

Other Notes

Man in the Middle/ARP Poisoning/Pauls Security Podcast

Resources/Links

Designing/implementing more secure ARP variation: http://www.cs.sjsu.edu/faculty/stamp/students/Roney298report.pdf

ARP and ICMP redirection games: http://insecure.org/sploits/arp.games.html

Flags